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Abstract 
We study a loan market equilibrium in which some borrowers are optimistic and banks face imperfect competition. 
We show that the presence of optimistic borrowers reduces the interest rate paid by safe borrowers and increases the 
interest rate paid by risky borrowers. But it has no net impact on the banks' profits.
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     1 Introduction
People tend to be unrealistically optimistic about the future. They expect others to be
victims of misfortune, but not themselves (see, e.g., Weinstein, 1980). Supporting this
view, Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) ￿nd that many entrepreneurs overestimate
their probability of success. In this note, we study a loan market equilibrium in which some
borrowers are optimistic and banks face imperfect competition in loan market.
The model is an application of Salop￿ s (1979) circular road model in loan market.
Three types of borrowers￿ safe, risky, and optimistic￿ are located uniformly around a unit
circle, and incur a transportation cost when traveling to banks. A safe borrower is endowed
with a safe project, and a risky borrower is endowed with a risky project. An optimistic
borrower is endowed with either a safe or a risky project, but every optimistic borrower
believes that his project is safe. Banks compete for borrowers by announcing the interest
rate for each type of projects. Borrowers then travel to banks to apply for loans. After that
banks screen each loan applicant to determine the applicable interest rate.
We show that the presence of optimistic borrowers reduces the interest rate paid by safe
borrowers, and increases the interest rate paid by risky borrowers. The intuition is as
follows. When deciding which bank to apply for a loan, optimistic borrowers only care
about how much a bank would charge for a safe project, because every optimistic borrower
believes that his project is safe. To attract optimistic borrowers, banks reduce the
announced interest rate for safe projects. Once borrowers have applied for loans and
learned the applicable interest rate, it is, however, too late to shop, because they have
incurred the transportation cost. To pro￿t from optimistic borrowers, banks increase the
announced interest rate for risky projects. We also show that the presence of optimistic
borrowers has no net impact on the banks￿pro￿ts.
Our paper is closely related to Hyytinen (2003). Using an elegant simple model, he
shows that borrower optimism reduces both equilibrium interest rate and banks￿pro￿ts.
Our model di⁄ers from his in two dimensions. First, in Hyytinen￿ s model, all the borrowers
are optimistic. In contrast, in our model, while some borrowers are optimistic, others are
rational. Assuming heterogeneous borrowers allows us to examine the impact of optimistic
borrowers on rational borrowers. Second, in Hyytinen￿ s model, a borrower knows the
applicable interest rate before he applies for a loan. In contrast, in our model, a borrower
learns the applicable interest rate after he has applied for a loan and the bank has screened
his creditworthiness. We believe that each model resembles the loan application process in
some markets. For example, in the prime mortgage market, lenders reveal the applicable
interest rate for free, without requiring potential borrowers to ￿rst submit loan application.
Hyytinen￿ s model resembles this process. In contrast, in the subprime mortgage market
featuring risk-based pricing, a borrower must often pay several hundred dollars in
application and appraisal fees and wait until closing to discover the actual interest rate (see,
e.g., McCoy 2007, and Willis 2006). Our model resembles this process. Thus, both models
are useful for understanding the impact of optimistic borrowers on loan market equilibrium.
Our paper joins the emerging behavioral industrial organization literature (see, e.g.,
DellaVigna, 2009; Ellison, 2006). Papers in this literature note that some consumers are
1biased, and examine the interaction between biased consumers and rational,
pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms. Our paper contributes to this literature by examining how
rational lenders respond to optimistic borrowers.
2 The model
Consider a universally risk-neutral economy in which a continuum of borrowers with
unit mass are located uniformly around a unit circle. There are also n > 2 banks located
symmetrically around the circle.
Each borrower is endowed with a project that requires an initial outlay of $1. A project
can be either one of two types: safe or risky. A safe project generates a cash ￿ ow R > 1
with probability 1. A risky project generates a cash ￿ ow R with probability 0 < p < 1, and
0 with probability 1 ￿ p. Both types of projects are creditworthy.
There are three types of borrowers: safe, risky, and optimistic. A proportion 0 < ￿ < 1
of borrowers are safe, a proportion 0 < ￿ < 1 of borrowers are risky, and the remaining
borrowers are optimistic. A safe borrower believes, correctly, that he is endowed with a safe
project. A risky borrower believes, correctly, that he is endowed with a risky project. A
proportion 0 < ￿ < 1 of optimistic borrowers are endowed with safe projects, and the
remaining optimistic borrowers are endowed with risky projects. However, every optimistic
borrower believes that his project is safe.1
Borrowers have no initial wealth and must seek ￿nancing from banks. Traveling to
banks is costly: borrowers incur a transportation cost of ￿ per unit of length.2 Banks
cannot observe the type of each borrower, but they know the proportion of each type, and
the proportion of optimistic borrowers who have safe projects. Banks face a perfectly
elastic supply of capital at a gross interest rate equal to ￿.
The timing of events is as follows. First, banks simultaneously announce a pair
(Rs;Rr), where Rs is the interest rate for safe projects, and Rr is the interest rate for risky
projects. Then, borrowers observe the announced interest rates and travel to the bank from
which they would like to apply for a loan. Finally, banks screen each loan applicant to
determine the applicable interest rate. We assume that banks can perfectly screen. This
assumption simpli￿es the calculations, but still conveys the full intuition.
3 Loan market equilibrium
Following Hyytinen (2003), we restrict attention to full-scale competition, uniform
pricing, and symmetric Nash equilibrium.3 We also assume that ￿ is small enough to
1This assumption is motivated by the well-documented ￿above average￿ e⁄ect: Most people believe
that they are more likely than their peers to experience positive events, and less likely than their peers to
experience negative events (see, among others, Weinstein, 1980).
2Degryse and Ongena (2005) ￿nd that transportation costs are important for small borrowers.
3Full-scale competition exists when the transportation cost ￿ is su¢ ciently small. See Villas-Boas and
Schmidt-Mohr (1999) for a complete characterization of the evolution of the equilibrium strategies with
2ensure that in equilibrium the entire market is served.4
Consider the decision problem of a representative bank i. Suppose that bank i
announces a pair of interest rates (Ris;Rir), and all other banks announce (Rs;Rr). A safe
borrower located at distance x from bank i and distance (1=n ￿ x) from bank i + 1 will be
indi⁄erent between going to either bank if









Taking into account the symmetric market area between bank i and bank i ￿ 1, and the
assumption that the proportion of safe borrower in the entire population of borrowers is ￿,
gives the following demand for loans of bank i from safe borrowers:















And the demand for loans from optimistic borrowers is given by
Dio =
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
n
￿
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(Ris ￿ Rs)
￿
:
Denote bank i￿ s pro￿ts by ￿i. Recall that a proportion ￿ of optimistic borrowers are
endowed with safe projects, and the remaining optimistic borrowers are endowed with risky
projects. Thus bank i￿ s pro￿ts can be written as:
￿i = (Ris ￿ ￿)(Dis + ￿Dio) + (pRir ￿ ￿)[Dir + (1 ￿ ￿)Dio]: (1)
Maximizing ￿i with respect to Ris yields the following ￿rst-order condition:
￿
n
￿ 2Ris + Rs + ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿
(pRir ￿ ￿) = 0: (2)
Maximizing ￿i with respect to Rir yields the following ￿rst-order condition:
[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿
n
￿ ￿p(Rir ￿ Rr) (3)
￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(Ris ￿ Rs) ￿￿ (pRir ￿ ￿) = 0:
transportation cost.
4Entrepreneurs are very much a self-selected group. The assumption that every borrower is served in
equilibrium constrains us from analyzing this issue. See de Meza and Southey (1996) for an interesting
analysis.
3Solving (2) and (3) simultaneously, and noting that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium
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Recall that the proportion of optimistic borrowers is 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. It is easy to verify that
dRs=d(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) < 0 and dRr=d(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) > 0. We have thus obtained the following
result.
Proposition 1. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the interest rate paid by safe borrowers
decreases with the proportion of optimistic borrowers, and the interest rate paid by risky
borrowers increases with the proportion of optimistic borrowers.
To understand the intuition behind proposition 1, note that when an optimistic
borrower chooses which bank to apply for a loan, he only cares about the interest rate for
safe projects, because every optimistic borrower believes that he has a safe project. This
provides an incentive for banks to reduce the announced interest rate for safe projects.
After an optimistic borrower arrives at a bank and learns whether his project is safe or
risky, it is too late for him to shop, because he has already incurred the transportation
cost. This provides an incentive for banks to increase the announced interest rate for risky
borrowers. Thus, the presence of optimistic borrowers bene￿ts safe borrowers, but hurts
risky borrowers.
Substituting Ris = Rs given by (4) and Rir = Rr given by (5) into (1), and simplifying




Proposition 2. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the presence of optimistic borrowers has
no net impact on the banks￿pro￿ts.
The presence of optimistic borrowers increases the pro￿ts that banks can obtain from
risky borrowers, but decreases the pro￿ts that banks can obtain from safe borrowers. In
equilibrium these two e⁄ects cancel out. As a result, the banks￿pro￿ts are not a⁄ected by
the presence of optimistic borrowers.
4 Discussion
We have presented a banking model with optimistic borrowers and imperfect
competition. We show that the presence of optimistic borrowers a⁄ects the banks￿interest
4rate decisions. Speci￿cally, banks reduce the interest rate for safe borrowers, but increase
the interest rate for risky borrowers.
In our model, the beliefs of borrowers are assumed to be exogenous. An important
question is: Do banks have incentives to in￿ uence the beliefs of borrowers? In a recent
paper, Inderst and Ottaviani (2010) develop a model in which an intermediary agent
advises customers on which products to purchase, based on the match between customer
needs and product features. Inderst and Ottaviani show that product providers have an
incentive to pay commissions to the intermediary agent in order to increase the sales of
their products. Jackson and Burlingame (2007) ￿nd evidence that some mortgage brokers
advised borrowers to take out more expensive mortgages. Indeed, an important lesson
emerging from the recent subprime mortgage crisis is that many subprime borrowers took
out mortgages that they could not a⁄ord. Examining whether and how banks in￿ uence the
beliefs of borrowers is an important question for future research.
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